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I. Introduction
Money laundering is not a new phenomenon. I However the recent
regional and global initiatives to counter money laundering have
intensified as a response to the spectre of terrorism, especially in the
wake of September 11. It is indisputable that money laundering, if left
unchecked would have far reaching adverse implications, domestically
and globally. Money launderers typically amass funds that are moved
from one jurisdiction to another to escape detection, as well as to
disguise or conceal the unlawful origins of their funds. The integrity
and financial soundness of financial institutions may be affected by the
increased volatility of inexplicable capital flows and exchange. Money
laundering activities perpetuate crime as they encourage further criminal
activities.
The banking system is regarded as the first line of defense
against money launderers. The banking system is particularly vulnerable
as the provision of banking facilities may inadvertently conceal or
facilitate criminal purposes. Banking secrecy, traditionally a legal and
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1 Money laundering legislation originated in the United States in 1970 with
the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, in response to organised crime,
especially in illegal drugs. The Act imposed record keeping and reporting
requirements on financial institutions.
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moral obligation that banks owe to their customers further aids in the
concealment of tainted funds. Banks being commercially driven, are
typically more interested in keeping the business, than in driving away
business to rival institutions through what may be regarded as
cumbersome procedures in the verification of customers and monitoring
of customers' transactions, except when strictly necessary. The
replacement of traditional face-to-face banking by automation and the
advent of internet, worldwide and 24-hour banking, not only
depersonalises banking, but facilitates money laundering activities as
banking transactions can be conducted virtually anytime, anywhere,
under the cloak of anonymity.
While the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing
Act 2001 (AMLA)2 is of general application and seeks to establish a
comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to combat money
laundering and terrorism financing, the focus in this article is on banks,
as one of the many "reporting institutions" with obligations under AMLA.
This article seeks to examine the duty and liability of banks
under AMLA. The focus is on the imposition of obligations of customer
identification and mandatory record keeping and reporting of suspicious
and large transactions. The article examines the relevant provisions
of AMLA, the duties and liabilities of banks prior to AMLA and
examines to what extent these duties and liabilities have been extended
by AMLA, and the resulting implications to the banker-customer
relationship.
Examination of the above issues will be undertaken in three
parts-the first examines specific major provisions of AM LA relevant
to the subject under discussion, the second reviews the position prior
to AMLA, and the third focuses on the impact of AMLA on the duty
and liability of banks.
2 For an instructive examination of the Act, refer to Norhashimah Mohd Yassin,
"An Examination of the Malaysian Anti-Money Laundering Act 200 I(AM LA)"
[2002] 6 CLJ i; "Precedents Relating to Money-Laundering" [2004] 3 CLJ i.
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II. Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing
Act 2001
The Anti Money Laundering Act came into force on 15 January 2002.
AMLA was enacted to comply with Malaysia's obligation as a member
of the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering. It incorporates
internationally accepted standards to combat money laundering, in
particular, the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering (FATF).3
As a result of the association of money laundering with terrorist
financing, a substantively revised set of recommendations were released
in 2003. Consequently FATF member countries (Malaysia being one)
were required to update their respective Anti-Money Laundering laws.
AMLA was amended to extend the mechanism under it (AMLA) to
trace, freeze, seize and forfeit assets intended for the financing of
terrorist acts, or assets belonging to known terrorists. The amendments
to AMLA and the Penal Code to cover terrorist financing were also
made to accede to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. The amended Act is now referred to as the
Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001. The
provisions hereafter referred to in this paper are provisions in AMLA,
except if stated otherwise.
A. What is Money Laundering?
The essence of money laundering is the concealment or disguise of the
proceeds of criminal activities, to make them appear as legitimate.
According to s 3(1):
"money laundering" means the act of a person who -
3 Malaysia became a member of the APG on 31 May 2000. Members include
Australia, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore,
Sri Lanka and Thailand. Members share knowledge and expertise relating to
measures to counter money laundering.
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(a) engages directly or indirectly, in a transaction that
involves proceeds of an unlawful activity;
(b) acquires, receives, possesses, disguises, transfers,
converts, exchanges, carries, disposes, uses, removes from
or brings into Malaysia proceeds of any unlawful activity;
or
(c) conceals, disguises or impedes the establishment of the
true nature, origin, location, movement, disposition, title of,
rights with respect to, or ownership of, proceeds of an
unlawful activity;
where -
(aa) as may be inferred from objective factual circumstance,
the person knows or has reason to believe, that the property
is proceeds from any unlawful activity;" or
(bb) in respect of the conduct of a natural person, the person
without reasonable excuse fails to take reasonable steps to
ascertain whether or not the property is proceeds from any
unlawful activity;
The offence of money laundering is committed by any person
who engages in, or attempts to engage in, or abets the commission of
money laundering.'
It is clear that banks face potential liability if they tum a blind
eye to circumstances that by objective standards should arouse suspicion
of the origins of funds, or by their failure to act to ascertain the source
of the funds. It would certainly be unusual for banks to act in
complicity with money launderers, although the possibility of individual
bank employees abetting or acting in concert with money launderers
4 According to s 3{I), "proceeds of an unlawful activity" means any property
derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of any
unlawful activity,
~ Section 4(1)(a) and (b).
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is not far fetched. In such circumstances, are banks liable for the
complicity of their employees? It would seem so. Pursuant to s 88,
employers who fail to establish preventive measures in the form of
procedures to detect money laundering may be vicariously liable for
offences committed by their employees."
B. How is Money Laundered?
Typically, there are three stages of money laundering:
1. Placement
This stage involves the physical deposit of the proceeds of the crime
eg the deposit of cash in banking accounts, or the deposit of tainted
valuables in safety deposit boxes. This might be done by breaking up
large amounts of cash into less conspicuous smaller sums. They are
then deposited directly into a bank account. At this stage the tainted
proceeds are closest to the "perpetrator" and therefore measures to
identify and link the tainted proceeds with the "perpetrator" are at its
most effective.
2. Layering
After the funds have entered the financial system, the layering stage
takes place. At this stage, the tainted proceeds are "laundered" through
the process of conversion, movement or transfer. Funds are transferred
among various accounts, at various banks across the globe or through
multiple, often complex transactions intended to distance and disguise
the true source of the funds. The transfer of funds across national
borders, especially to jurisdictions with weak or non-existent anti money
6 Section 88(a) on "offence by an individual" provides:
Where a person is liable under this Act to a penalty for any act,
omission, neglect or default, he shall be liable to the same penalty
for the act, omission, neglect or default of his employee, ... if the
act, omission, neglect or default was committed by:
(a) his employee in the course of the employee's employment.
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laundering laws, or jurisdictions with strong banking secrecy provisions
facilitate this process of layering. Identification and tracing of the
proceeds have to take into account the complexities of pursuing the
tainted proceeds and perpetrators across national borders. The "audit
trail" becomes difficult to follow.
3. Integration
At this stage the tainted funds move to the third stage-integration in
which the tainted funds find their way to legitimate individuals or
organisations, where they are mixed or "integrated" with the legitimate
funds or property of such individuals or organisations eg as real estate,
luxury assets or business ventures. There is no apparent link between
the funds and the criminal activities from which they were generated,
facilitating the furtherance of criminal activities. The. process of
laundering "dirty money" is now complete.
C. Retrospective and Extraterritorial Application?
AMLA applies to property situated in Malaysia and outside Malaysia."
Thus the requirements of AMLA, eg the requirements of customer
verification, record-keeping and reporting would apply to overseas
branches and subsidiaries. Extraterritorial reach of AMLA is crucial
as the rapid development in technology and communication allow for
faster and easier cross border transfers, to avoid detection and
prosecution.
7 Refer to Kriz, G, "International Co-operation to Combat Money Laundering:
The Nature and Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties" [1993J I CLJ xxvi.
Refer also to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002.
8 Thus banks incorporated in Malaysia with branches in foreign jurisdictions
are subject to AMLA. They may also be subject to equivalent money
laundering legislations in the host country. Conversely, foreign incorporated
banks operating in Malaysia are subject to both money laundering lcgislauons
of their country of domicile as well as AM LA.
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The Act also expressly provides that it applies to all money
laundering offences" "whether committed before or after the
commencement date"!". The retrospectivity of AMLA conflicts with
Article 7(1) of the Federal Constitution that prohibits persons from
being tried under retrospective criminal laws. A pertinent question to
ask is how does this provision stand in the light of Article 4(1) of the
Federal Constitution, wherein any law passed after Merdeka Day
which is inconsistent with the Constitution shall to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void?
D. Establishment 0/ a Competent Authority"
Integral to a regulatory and supervisory framework to combat money
laundering and terrorism financing is the appointment of a "competent
authority" to carry out the functions of a financial intelligence unit
(FlU). Bank Negara Malaysia has been appointed to this role pursuant
to s 7 of AMLA. By virtue of s 8 of AMLA the FlU is empowered
to receive and analyse information and reports from any person, including
reporting institutions with regard to large and suspicious transactions.
If the FlU, on analysis, has reason to believe the funds are the proceeds
of an unlawful activity or linked to terrorist activity, the report and
financial intelligence is forwarded to the relevant enforcement agency
for investigation and subsequent prosecution. The FlU is also
empowered to give instructions to banks (as reporting institutions) in
relation to any information received as well as to provide training for
9 According to s 82 Jurisdiction -
(I) Any offence under this Act -
(a) on the high seas on board any ship or on any aircraft registered
in Malaysia;
(b) by any citizen or any permanent resident on the high seas on
board any ship or on any aircraft; or
(c) by any citizen or any permanent resident in any place outside
and beyond the limits of Malaysia,
may be dealt with as if it had been committed at any place within
Malaysia.
10 Section 2{I).
II Refer to Part III of AMLA.
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banks in respect of their reporting and record keeping obligation under
AMLAI2 The FlU also exercises powers of investigation, examination
of person, and search and retention of documents.!' The FlU is also
vested with the power to issue guidelines, circulars or notices to banks
in order to give effect to the provisions of AMLA'4
E. Two Categories of "Whistle Blowers"
Information on money laundering activities may come from two main
reporting routes: from reporting institutions and individual informers.
1. Reporting Institutions
AMLA imposes specific obligations on reporting institutions. These
institutions are listed in the First Schedule of AMLA For present
purposes, the list of "reporting institutions" includes commercial banks,
merchant banks, Islamic banks as well as the Labuan offshore bank.
In addition, a reporting institution is defined as "any person, including
branches and subsidiaries outside Malaysia of that person, who carries
on any activity, listed in the First Schedule"."
2. Individual Informers
By virtue of s 5 of AMLA, individuals may also disclose to an
enforcement agency his knowledge or belief of money laundering
activities. Such a disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any
restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by any law, con-
tract or rules of professional conduct."
Provided the disclosure was not made in bad faith, the informant
also enjoys immunity from any loss arising out of the disclosure. Section
12 Section 8(3)(d).
n Refer to Part V.
14 Section 21 (1)(c).
I~ Section 3(1).
16 Section 5(1 )(b).
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24 protects an informant from any civil, criminal or disciplinary
proceedings arising out of such disclosure. This would cover the
protection afforded to "whistle blowers" within the organisation eg a
bank employee who has "inside" knowledge of "suspicious transactions"
or dubious customers and discloses the same to an enforcement agency.
In such circumstances, the employee cannot be sued by the customer,
or indeed his employer, the bank, for damages for breach of contract
and defamation, as the case may be.
F. Tipping-Off
Secrecy of disclosure and possible as well as ongoing investigations of
suspicious customers and transactions of such customers is crucial to
ensure effective enforcement of AMLA. The speed and expediency
with which evidence of money laundering may be concealed or
destroyed makes secrecy of paramount importance. Thus, any person,
including banks, face potential liability in the event they divulge to other
persons the possibility of an investigation or an ongoing investigation or
that disclosure has been made to the relevant authorities. I? Defences
apply if it is proven that the person either, did not know or suspect that
the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation or that he had
lawful authority or reasonable excuse to make the disclosure. IS In
what circumstances would banks be permitted to raise such defences?
An example would be disclosure by banks to third parties in response
to an enquiry of a customer's creditworthiness (banking references).
G. Banking Secrecy Overridden
Wrongdoing is frequently cloaked in secrecy and unfortunately bank
confidentiality can act as a barrier to bringing culprits to book. Section
20 of AMLA in categorical terms imposes a duty of disclosure on
banks, "notwithstanding any obligation as to secrecy or other restrictions
on the disclosure of information imposed by any written law or
otherwise"."
17 Section 35(1).
18 Section 35(4)(b).
19 See ss 98-99 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA)
on "permitted disclosures" for an equivalent restriction on banking secrecy.
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H. Freezing of Movable Property
Additional provisions seek to cut off the financial resources of criminals
by the freezing, seizure and forfeiture of criminal proceeds, or assets
intended for the financing of criminal activities. AMLA provides that
the Public Prosecutor, after consultation with Bank Negara Malaysia,
is empowered to issue an order to direct a bank "not to part with, deal
in, or otherwise dispose of such property or any part of it until the
order is revoked or varied"." In effect such an order acts as a legal
bar to payment, similar to the imposition of a garnishee order or a
Mareva injunction on a customer's account.
III. Banks Duties to Customers prior to AMLA
The specific duties examined are customer identification and the duty
to inquire in suspicious circumstances.
A. Customer Identification
The duty of banks to verify the identity of customers, particularly as
a prerequisite to opening a bank account, is well established by common
law.
The bank's duty to verify the identity of their customer is
crucial in order to invoke the protection ofs 85 of the Bills of Exchange
Act 1949. According to that section, banks are liable in conversion to
the true owner of a cheque unless the banks had acted honestly and
without negligence. Failure to properly identify their customers when
opening accounts has been established by case law as imputing
negligence. What is less clear however is the scope of "identifying
information" which banks have a duty to verify.
20 Section 50( 1).
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In a number of cases such as Ladbroke & Co v Todd." St
John's Hampstead v Barclays Bank Ltd'? and Lumsden & Co v
London Trustee Savings Bank." as well as the local case of The
Rubber Industry (Replanting) Board v HSBC,24 the banks concerned
were found to be negligent in opening accounts without making adequate
inquiries as to the true identity of their customers. This was seen to
be particularly important in cases where the account holder was a
foreigner, about whom little was known.
In Lumsden & Co v London Trustee Savings Bank.
Donaldson J found the bank negligent as it had failed to follow up on
inquiries and no attempt had been made to verify the identity of the
customer. His Lordship said:"
Again in the unsatisfactory position of a customer and a
referee both newly arrived from abroad and to that extent
liable to be more of an unknown quantity no attempt was
made to obtain independent confirmation of Brown's identity,
by for example, a request for the production of his passport.
Last but by no means least, there was a failure to inquire
further when Dr Blake failed to give any banker as a referee
despite an express and very necessary request for this
information. This above all else facilitated the assumption
of a fictitious personality, buttressed by a fraudulent
reference.
21 30 TLR 433.
22 (1923) 39 TLR 28. Acton J decided that a bank was negligent when it failed
to detect that a customer had used a false name.
23 [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep 114. Donaldson J found the bank negligent when it
failed to follow up on inquiries and had made no attempt to verify the identity
of the customer.
24 [1957] MLJ 103.
25 Supra n 23 at p 121.
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However, in Marfani & Co Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd'?
involving a foreigner, the failure of the bank to verify the identity of
their customer was not treated as imputing negligence on the bank as
the customer had been introduced by a long established customer who
had in the past introduced other satisfactory customers.
B. Scope of "Identifying Information"
In Lloyd's Bank v E B Savory," the House of Lords by a majority
laid down the rule that a bank when opening an account for a new
customer should ascertain the name of the customer's employer. Failure
to take this precaution may amount to negligence if the customer
subsequently appropriates and pays into his account cheques of his or
her employer. However in Orbit Mining and Trading Co Ltd v
Westminster Bank Ltd,28Harman LJ frowned upon this rule as imposing
an onerous obligation on banks:
In the latest case in the House of Lords on this subject,
Lloyd's Bank Ltd v E B Savory & Co, it was held by the
majority that a collecting bank had acted with negligence
in not inquiring when two accounts were opened as to the
employers of the customer. This seems to me a hard
doctrine, but it has no application here. It cannot at any
rate be the duty of the bank continually to keep itself up
to date as to the identity of a customer's employer.
c. Duty to Inquire in Suspicious Circumstances
It is well established that banks acting in the capacity of collecting or
paying bankers may be found to be negligent and liable to third parties
2b [1968] I WLR 956. In this case the plaintiffs alleged the bank had acted
negligently when they opened the account without requesting the customer
for identification, ascertaining his employer and previous banking references.
~7 [1933) AC 201. The case involved the perpetration of fraud by the deposit
of cheques belonging to the account holders' employers.
2 [1963) I QB 794.
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if they failed to make inquiries when confronted with suspicious
circumstances.
There are instances when the account or transactions involving
the accounts of customers arouse suspicion. In Lloyds Bank v The
Chartered Bank of India. Australia and China." the Court of Appeal
decided where the circumstances surrounding the deposit of cheques
are unusual, banks are put on enquiry when it collects the cheque. In
Motor Traders Guarantee Corporation v Midland Bank Ltd,30
Goddard J was of the opinion that a collecting bank was under a duty
to make inquiries where the account of the customer was operated in
an irregular manner.
Paying banks may be liable as constructive trustees to third
parties, as the following cases illustrate. In the case of Karak Rubber
v Burden." a bank had paid on a cheque to unauthorised persons.
Brightman J, in finding the bank liable, stated that a bank is not an
"automatic cash dispenser". The bank had a duty to exercise reasonable
care and skill and "that care and skill must rationally include, in
appropriate circumstances, a duty to inquire before paying". The
matters to be considered include:
(i) first and foremost whether the operation was unusual and out
of the ordinary course of banking business;
(ii) the magnitude of the transaction;
(iii) the time and opportunity available to the bank for making
inquiry; and
(iv) the degree of suspicion which the known facts would have
provoked in the mind of a reasonable banker."
2Q [1928] 44 TLR 534.
30 [1937] 4 All ER 90.
31 [1972] 1 WLR602.
32 Id at p 629.
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D. The Standard of Care
In determining whether in the instant case the bank had acted
negligently or not, courts frequently evaluate the banks' conduct by
reference to tests or standards. Two such tests are:
(i) the "ordinary practice of bankers" test; and
(ii) the "protection against fraud" test.
The "ordinary practice of bankers" test was enunciated by the
High Court of Australia in Commissioners of State Savings Bank v
Permewan, Wright & Co, as follows:"
The test of negligence is whether the transaction of paying
in any given cheque, coupled with the circumstances
antecedent and present, was so out of the ordinary course
that it ought to have aroused doubts in the banker's mind,
and caused them to make inquiry.
The Privy Council in Commissioners 0/ Taxation v English,
Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd 34 endorsed the test. According to
this test, the standard of care expected of a banker is pegged to
current prudent banking practice. As the Privy Council advised:
If therefore a standard is sought, it must be the standard
to be derived from the ordinary practice of bankers, not
individuals."
The same test was alluded to by Diplock LJ in Mar/ani & Co
Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd:36
11 (1914) 19 CLR 457 at p 478.
1~ [1920] AC 683
l' Ibid.
16 [1968] I WLR 956 at p 975.
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What facts ought to be known to the banker, that is, what
inquiries he should make, and what facts are sufficient to
cause him reasonably to suspect that the customer is not
the true owner must depend on current banking practice,
and change as that practice changes.
The "protection against fraud" test was formulated later by
Lord Warrington in the case of Lloyds Bank Ltd v EB Savory & Co
and expressed as follows:"
The standard by which the absence, or otherwise, of
negligence is to be determined must ... be ascertained by
reference to the practice of reasonable men carrying on the
business of bankers and endeavouring to do so in such a
manner as may be calculated to protect themselves and
others against fraud it is argued that ... a bank is not
negligent, if it takes all precautions usually taken by bankers.
I do not accept the latter proposition as true in cases where
the ordinary practice of bankers fails in making due provision
for a risk fully known to those experienced in the business
of banking.
The standard of care expected of banks in the "protection
against fraud test" is apparently higher than the ordinary practice of
bankers' test. Banks that merely follow the current practice of banks,
without regard to extenuating circumstances, may not escape liability,
although Diplock LJ in Marfani's case, cautions:"
... but I venture to think that this court should be hesitant
in condemning as negligent a practice generally adopted by
those engaged in the banking business.
Simpson J in National City Bank of New York v Ho Hong
Bank Ltd had cautioned against putting too onerous a burden on banks
in the following terms:"
)7 [1933] AC 201 at p 221.
38 [1968] 1 WLR 956 at p 975.
39 [1932] MLJ 64 at p 66.
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Moreover bank officials can be expected to be reasonably
competent and careful but not to be amateur detectives and
with a detective's trained powers of observation.
E. Banking Secrecy
At common law, it has long been established that banks owe a duty,
subject to certain qualifications, to keep their customers affairs
confidential. This duty is implied in the contract between banker and
customer. The duty remains even after the termination of the banker-
customer relationship. Breach of such duty would put banks at risk
of an action for breach of contract by the affected customer. More
importantly, such banks risk losing the confidence and goodwill of
current as well as potential customers.
Nevertheless, there are qualifications to this duty. Bankes LJ
in the classic case of Tournier v National Provincial and Union
Bank of England" recognised four categories of qualifications to the
duty of confidentiality, as follows:
(i) where disclosure is under compulsion by law;
(ii) where there is a duty to the public to disclose;
(iii) where the interests of the bank require disclosure;
(iv) where the disclosure is made with the express or implied
consent of the customer.
In Malaysia the position on banking secrecy is governed by ss
97 to 102 of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA).
These provisions, in effect, prohibit any director or officer of any
financial institution from disclosing information on a cu tomer's account
to any person. IIowever, ss 98-102 details what is expressed as
"permitted disclosures". Among them:
40 [1924] 1 K.B 461.
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"where the disclosure is authorised in writing by Bank
Negara Malaysia", or where such disclosure is authorised
under any Federal law to be made to a police officer
investigating into an offence specified in such law ... "42
The scope of exceptions or qualifications to the bank's duty of
confidentiality under BAFIA is considerably more extensive than that
laid down in Tournier's case." This was the position even prior to
AMLA.
Preventive measures to combat money laundering were not
initiated by AMLA. Even prior to AMLA, Bank Negara Malaysia
had put in place a supervisory framework for the compliance of financial
institutions in the form of the "Guidelines on Money Laundering and
Know Your Customer Policy"."
1. Customer Identification
Prior to the enactment of AMLA, Bank Negara had on 27 December
1993 issued the abovementioned Guidelines in an effort to combat
money laundering through customer identification and verification,
financial record keeping and mandatory reporting of suspicious
transactions. The Guidelines, referred to as BNM/GP9, in effect requires
banking institutions to determine the true identity of customers opening
accounts or utilizing any other services of the banks. Banks were
advised to develop a "transaction profile" of every customer with the
objective of identifying unusual patterns of transactions or suspicious
transactions.
2. Reporting Suspicious Transactions
The Guidelines require banks to report immediately to Bank Negara all
cases of suspicious transactions. Banking institutions are also required
41 Section 99{ 1)(i) BAFIA.
42 Section 99{ 1)(h) BAFIA.
43 Supra n 40.
44 Bank Negara Guidelines (BNM/GP9).
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to identify a single reference point within their organisation to which
unusual or suspicious transaction can be reported promptly. While the
Guidelines encourage the use of a standard format to lodge the report,
it is left to individual banks to establish proper procedures and appoint
designated officers to liaise with Bank Negara.
There was no attempt to define the circumstances that would
put the bank on enquiry or what would amount to suspicious
transactions. However Appendix I of the Guidelines gives more than
40 examples of suspicious transactions in different banking transactions,
eg "money laundering using cash transactions, money laundering using
bank accounts, money laundering using investment related transactions".
The Guidelines were largely intended to create an awareness of money
laundering by giving examples of suspicious transactions that may
reveal them as illegitimate funds. It was a precursor. to AMLA.
Ilowever, BNM/GD9 lacked legal force, expressly stipulating:
While there is no legal requirement at present for banking
institutions to detect money laundering activities and report
to the appropriate authorities, there is a moral and ethical
obligation on the part of the banking institutions not to
facilitate money laundering activities."
The Guidelines remain in force even after the enactment of
AMLA. They are intended to be complementary to AMLA.
IV. Duties and Liabilities of Banks under AMLA
AMLA criminalises money laundering and appoints the Financial
Intelligence Unit of Bank Negara as the competent authority to
implement and administer provisions of AMLA. As a reporting institution
banks are required to put in place effective procedures:
4~ BNM/GP9 at p 3.
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(i) to ensure that persons conducting banking business are properly
identified;"
(ii) to report SUSpICIOUStransactions and cash transactions
above a specified threshold;"
(iii) to keep and retain records of specified transactions;" and
(iv) to develop and implement an internal compliance programme"
For the purposes of this article, examination of the bank's
liability under AMLA would focus primarily on the duty to verify the
identity of account holders and the duty to report suspicious transactions.
The duty of record keeping and implementation of compliance
programmes, being largely operational, will be referred to briefly.
A. Duty to Verify the Identity of Account Holder
Banks are required to open and maintain accounts only in thc names
of the account holders. 50 This is further reinforced by s 16(1 )(b)
whereby anonymous accounts or accounts under fictitious, false or
incorrect names are strictly prohibited. By virtue of s 18(2) where
persons may be known by more than one name eg an alias, he is
required to disclose the names to the bank before opening an account.
Banks are required to report to the competent authority, a client or
clients" who use a different name or names from the name by which
he or they are commonly known. Contravention of s 18 by banks
would be an offence which on conviction makes the bank liable to a
46 Section 16.
47 Section 14.
48 Section 13(3)(d).
49 Section 19.
so Section 16 (I )(a).
51 Section 3( I) defines "client" to include a customer. The usage of the term
"client" applies to a wider class of persons dealing with banks. At common
law, the term "customer" has a specific interpretation. See Great Western
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fine not exceeding one million ringgit or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding one year or to both. 52
In addition, banks are under a statutory duty to verify particulars
of their "clients", which particulars include their identity, representative
capacity, domicile, legal capacity, occupation or business purpose. 53
The verification applies, whether the "client" is an occasional or habitual
client." The above duty applies whenever the banks conducts business
relations, and "particularly when opening new accounts or passbooks,
entering into any fiduciary transaction, renting of a safe deposit box,
or performing any cash transaction exceeding such amount as the
competent authority may specify". Banks are also required to be alert
to situations where the bank doubts that the person" is opening an
account or conducting a transaction not as a principal but on behalf of
some other person "particularly in the case of a person, who is not
conducting any commercial, financial, or industrial operations in the
foreign State where it has its headquarters or domicile"."
Banks are expected to take a greater interest in their customers
and the transactions effected by them. Keeping a detailed "customer
profile" and "customer transaction profile", continuous monitoring and
surveillance must become part and parcel of "banking business".
Railway Co v London and County Banking Co Ltd [1901] AC 414, IlL,
Commissioners 0/ Taxation v English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd
[1920] AC683, IlL, Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 QB 55; approved by
Oriental Bank of Malaya v Rubber Industry (Replanting Board) [1957J MLJ
153, CA. In summary, the term "customer" applies to persons who open an
account with the bank, or performs a service not on a casual basis.
~~Section 18(5).
~1According to s 16(2)(a), the documents for identification include the identity
card, passport, birth certificate, driver's licence and constituent documents.
~4 Section 16(2).
~~According to s 16 (4), "person" shall include any person who is a nominee,
agent, beneficiary or principal in relation to a transaction.
~b Sccuon 16(3).
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B. Duty to Report Suspicious Transactions
Section 14 of AMLA requires a reporting institution to make a prompt
report to the competent authority:
(a) where the transaction exceeds an amount specified by the
competent authority; and
(b) where the identity of the person involved, the transaction or
other circumstances are such that gives an officer or employee
of the reporting institution reason to suspect that the
transaction involves proceeds of an unlawful activity.
Compliance with the requirement in paragraph (a) poses no
problem. However, the same cannot be said of paragraph (b). Given
the multiplicity, diversity and complexity of transactions, the ingenuity
of criminals in "covering their tracks", plus the differing responses in
terms of what would arouse the suspicions of an officer or employee
of a bank (red flags), it would be difficult to ascertain when this duty
is invoked and therefore a failure to act attracts potential liability. The
case law on the standard of care that banks must exercise and instances
when that standard has been regarded as breached, would certainly
act as guidelines. The penalty for contravention of the abovementioned
section on conviction is liability to a fine not exceeding one million
ringgit or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year, or to
both."
C. Duty of Record Keeping
Banks, designated as reporting institutions, have a statutory duty to
keep records of transactions involving domestic and foreign currency
above a certain threshold to be determined by the FlU. The records
are to be retained for a period of not less than six years from the date
57 Section 17(4).
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an account has been closed or the completion or termination of the
transaction. 58
D. Duty to Implement Compliance Program'?
An integral part of the AMLA framework is the imposition of a
statutory duty on banks to adopt, develop and implement internal
programmes, policies, procedures and controls to guard against and
detect money laundering offences. The programmes include:
(i) the establishment of procedures to ensure high standards of
integrity of its employees and a system to evaluate the
personal, employment and financial history of their
employees;
(ii) on-going employee training programmes, such as "know your
customer programme"; and
(iii) an independent audit function to check compliance with such
programmes.
v. Consequences of Non-Compliance with AMLA
AMLA imposes a statutory duty on a reporting institution to comply
with all obligations under the Act. Section 22 empowers the competent
authority, upon application to the J Iigh Court, to enforce compliance
with any obligations under AMLA, if the court is satisfied that the
bank's failure to report was without reasonable excuse. Failure to
comply with the directive would result on conviction to a fine not
exceeding RM 100,000 or imprisonment to a term not exceeding six
months or to both. If the offence continues, a further fine not exceeding
RM I00,000 per day is imposed.
'K Section 17( I).
,,, Refer to s 19.
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VI. Conclusion
A. Significance of AMLA
From a consideration of the above, it is apparent that the bank's duty
to verify the identity of the customer and to be put on enquiry in the
face of suspicious circumstances existed even prior to AMLA.
However there was neither a duty on banks to maintain records of
specified transactions nor to develop and implement internal policies
and procedures as part of the compliance programme. However
AMLA ushered significant changes for banks, banking business,
customers as well as third parties as discussed above.
To summarise, the duties imposed on banks by AMLA appears
to be more extensive. In effect it imposes on banks a statutory duty
to scrutinize every new account holder and to be on the alert for
persons who may be known by different names. The "identifying
information" that a bank has to elicit from every new account-holder
is considerably more than that required by case law. The usage of the
term "client" is deliberately wider than that of the term "customer",
and explicitly includes the person who transacts with a bank on a one
off or occasional basis. What would amount to suspicious
circumstances, and the standard of care expected of a prudent banker,
would still be a question to be determined on the individual facts. In
this instance, case law would be especially useful.
The compliance framework under AMLA certainly places
onerous duties on banks with severe penalties on contravention. These
"new" duties certainly extend further than the duties imposed by
common law. The implications for the customer are no less significant.
Inroads have been made into the sanctity of client confidentiality and
a customer is likely to 'be subjected to invasive due diligence. The
banker-customer relationship is not just governed by implied and express
terms customary to banker-customer relations, but also by statutory
terms which may well takes precedence over the contractual terms.
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Most significantly, AMLA is in the genre of a criminal statute
with consequent criminal penalties on contravention of its provision. If
the failure of banks to be vigilant to suspicious circumstances would
have exposed them to liability in tort from the "true owner", the same
lack of vigilance would be an offence punishable by a stiff fine.
While the need to put in place effective anti-money laundering
laws is undisputed, one must not lose sight of the "costs" this translates
into to the banks and the customer. The statutory requirement for
banks to establish compliance programmes, staff training, procedures
for record keeping and internal reporting mechanism will certainly
drive up the cost of "banking business", as well as enforcement.
Ultimately, will this "cost" be passed on to the customers?
B. How Effective are Anti-Money Laundering Statutes?
The primary objective of AMLA in imposing a stringent compliance
program on banks is to guard against the banking system being used
by money launderers. This has necessitated imposing additional duties
and corresponding liabilities on banks. It has also re-written the terms
of the banker-customer relationship. lIas AMLA achieved its
objective?
Banks are oriented towards serving their customers; they are
not trained to be "detectives with a detective's trained powers of
observation't.s? With primarily book knowledge of detection, they are
probably familiar with certain kinds of frauds, like cheque or credit
card frauds more than money laundering activities, even when committed
before their very noses, on the premises of banks.
The reporting obligations imposed on banks may in the long
run become counter productive. Banks, for fear of attracting liability,
or indeed losing their banking licenses, may err on the side of caution,
reporting every transaction that appears even slightly dubious. The
eo Lloyd's Bank Ltd \. Chartered Bank of India, Australia, CII/no [1929] 1
KB40.
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competent authority, overwhelmed with reports may find the task of
sieving the legitimate from the illicit transaction difficult, somewhat
equivalent to looking for a needle in the haystack. In a study in the
United States of America, it was revealed that an estimate of only 1%
of suspicious transactions reported resulted in a conviction." It is
certainly true that most clients of banks are "legitimate". However
AMLA in its effort to apprehend the few "illegitimate" clients casts
a wide regulatory net.
At the end of the day, the question that may be asked is that
are such AMLA measures producing results that commensurate with
the employment of resources? The AMLA may have put a damper
to criminals as it were, laughing all the way to the bank, but there are
"launderettes" other than banks, and criminals wise up soon enough to
seek other avenues. A recent study in US found that the focus of anti
money laundering measures on fmancial institutions resulted in criminals
using the postal system, said to provide the cheapest and most efficient
way to move tainted money." What may well transpire is that while
criminals find alternative "launderettes", banks are left with onerous
duties of customer identification, record keeping and reporting of
suspicious transactions, and customers have to bear with invasive "due
diligence" conducted on them, while money launderers as it were
"have left the building". Be that as it may, it may well be true, as the
argument goes, that should such preventive measures be lifted from
banks, criminals would certainly and quickly find their way back!
It is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of AMLA and
its far reaching implications to the banker-customer relationship. For
AMLA to be effective and fulfill the objectives for which it was
intended, banks must not view AMLA as just another compliance
issue to be performed in a perfunctory way, for that would defeat the
very purpose for which AMLA was conceived.
61 Refer to "Money Laundering and Terrorism: A Failed Past and a Bleak
Future", accessed at http://www .fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/
financialone.htn, accessed on 29 November 2005.
62 Ibid.
